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Current radical theology to the contrary notwithstanding,
God is not ontologically dead; and even the contention that
the symbol "God" is linguistically dead has only limited
validity. But the metaphorical language historically associated
with the doctrine of justification is indeed close to death; it
is no longer an adequate vehicle for conveying an understanding of this doctrine. There are two principal reasons for
this. I n the first place, the traditional vocabulary labors under
the intrinsic limitation and one-sidedness of each term, as
evident for example in the juridical origin and connotation of
the term "justification" itself. In the second place, the
terminology has been reinterpreted so often and so radically
that it now carries scarcely any theological freight at all. It is
our purpose, therefore, briefly to indicate what may be understood as a "Christian doctrine of justification" without
employing such terminology as "justification," "sanctification," "regeneration," "reconciliation, ') "atonement,"
"redemption," "conversion," and "grace."
At the same time, however, it is hoped that this may be not
simply an exercise in translation, but a constructive outline
within a context of conservative, but contemporary (and
therefore necessarily critical), Protestant thought. That is,
the objective is an interpretative restatement of the New
Testament witness to the event and experience of divine
forgiveness, at the same time making use of what can be
learned in dialogue with historical and contemporary Christian
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thought. Yet the hope of accomplishment is tempered by
Barth's question: "Even when we have done our best, which
of us can think that we have even approximately mastered the
subject, or spoken even a penultimate word in explanation
of it ?" a

I
A preliminary clarification of "forgiveness as event" is in
order. This "event" is not to be understood in the sense of a
de %ova decision, action, or attitude of God in connection with
or response to human attitude or experience; for divine
forgiveness is properly understood as eternal, that is, outside
the created, temporal order. This is the fundamental meaning
of the much-abused doctrine of election: forgiveness and
acceptance is not something new and recent even in regard to
individual man, but is rather a steady, constant element in the
being of God; forgiveness is the way God is toward man as
1 In addition to observing its primary responsibility to the data of
the New Testament, any new statement of a Christian doctrine of
justification must be attentive to its distinguished predecessors in the
history of theology. Some of the most important of these are in
Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter; Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologiue, 1-11, qq. 109-14, "Treatise on Grace"; Luther, Lectures on
Romans, on 3 : 1-5 and 4: 1-7,Lectures on Galatians (1535),"Argument"
and on 2 : 15-21 ; Melanchthon, Apology for the Augsburg Confession,
arts. 4-6; Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, bk. 111, chs. I 1-18;
Canons and Decrees of the Courtcil of Tmnt, Sixth Session, "Concerning
Justification"; J. Wesley, Sermons on Several Occasions, Sermon V,
"Justification by Faith"; F. Schleierrnacher, The Christian Faith, secs.
106-1 12 ; A. 13. Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and
ReconciZiation, chs. 1-3.
The most significant recent formulations are in R. Niebuhr, The
Nature and Destiny of Man, 11, chs. 4-5 ; K. Barth, Church Dogmatics,
I V ~ Isec.
, 61, and IV/z, sec. 66 ; E. Brunner, Dogmatics, 111, chs. 10-22 ;
P. Tillich, The Courage to Be and Systematic Theology, 111, pt. IV, sec.
111-A-3; H. Kiing, Justification, pt. 2. On the development of Seventhday Adventist thought about justification, see N. F. Pease, By Faith
Alone (Mountain View, Calif., 19621, pp. 107-224.
To keep the present outline as concise as possible, references to
Biblical and other materials have been severely limited and in general
confined to footnotes.
a Barth, Church Dogmatics (Edinburgh, 1936-), IV/2, 5 19.
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sinner. Essentially eternal, the divine forgiveness was enacted
in human history in the person of Jesus Christ, in whom the
constant attitude of forgiveness expressed itself as the supreme
act of forgiveness as God Himself participated in the catastrophic consequences of human sin. ti
"Forgiveness as event" is therefore to be under stood in the
sense of a new experience of individual man, in which the
divine attitude and action becomes effective in recognition,
acknowledgment, and response. This is the human action of
faith, and "in this action, and this action alone, [God's]
pardon actually comes fully into its own." Yet this event is
not merely the joyous discovery of a religious fact (e.g., the
fact that God is not really angry after all, so that the experience of existential guilt is an illusion). The event involves an
actually changed relationship, analogous to the changed
relationship involved in the event of human forgiveness.
Mt 25 : 34 ; Eph I : 4-5 ; Rom 8 : 28-30.
z Ti I : 9-10;I Pe I : 19-20. Rev 13: 8 is ambiguous ; the text may
mean either "whose name has not been written in the book of life of the
Lamb that was slain before the foundation of the world" (cf. KJV) or
"whose name has not been written before the foundation of the world
in the book of life of the Lamb that was slain" (RSV). If the former
was intended, the passage may be cited here; if the latter, it belongs
with those cited above, n. 3.
ti Col I : 19-20;Rorn 3 : 23-24; 5: 8-9. Cf. Kiing, Justification:
The Doctrine of Karl Barth and at Catholic Reflection (New York, 1964)~
p. 231 : "The decisive element in the sinner's justification is found not
in the individual but in the death and resurrection of Christ. I t was
there that our situation was actually changed; there the essential
thing happened." Cf. also G. Schrenk's article on 8txtx~o<,6~xa~oa6vy,
&xac6w, etc., in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, ed.
G. Kittel (Grand Rapids, 1963-), 11, 178-225.
Rom3 : 26;Barth11V/r,615.Cf.Rom3 : 28,30;4 : 5;Galz : 16;
3 : 8, 11, 24.
Schleiermacher can easily be interpreted as being headed in this
wrong direction; cf. The Christian Faith, (NewYork, 1963),pp. 270-314,
476-524.
Not only does the one offended overcome all hostility and resentment in response to the offense, and offer himself to the offender in
personal communion, declaring that no moral barrier exists between
them; but also the offender, on his part, forgoes any attempt a t selfjustification and repudiates any hostility that may have prompted or
a
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Forgiveness is experienced, and in the experience of divine
forgiveness, the experience of divine-human reunion, God
communicates Himself to individual man in a new way-a
way so new that the experience is properly said to inaugurate
a new mode of human being.
So, although the divine forgiveness may be, and indeed
must be, considered as eternal and non-temporal in the being
of God, and as historically enacted in the life and death of
Jesus of Nazareth, the focus of the present outline is divine
forgiveness as a personal event in the life of individual man.

II
Having just explained that we are concerned with divine
forgiveness as an experienced event in the life of individual
man, we must immediately insist that it is by no means an
independent event, and that it can be adequately understood
only in the context of the divine activity in Christ which is
continuous in human time and universal in human space. The
relationship of the universal, continuous activity of God to the
event in the life of individual man may be clarified by considering the divine activity in terms of four constituent elements, all of which are prior to the experience of forgiveness
logically and chronologically, but which also continue in one
way or another so that they are finally simultaneous with the
experienced event. Because all four elements represent the
free activity of God (free because man does nothing to earn
them and because God is not under any external requirement
to perform them), we shall refer to them as prior divine
"gifts."
accompanied the offense, offering himself to the one offended in a
renewal of the communion broken by the offense, and affirming that
no,moral barrier existsbetween them. Thus (to use the familiar Tillichian
language) forgiveness is experienced as the overcoming of personal
estrangement, the reunion of that which has been separated. This is
much more than the discovery of a psychological fact.
"New creation": 2 Cor 5 : 17;Gal 6 : 15."New man": Eph 4 : 24;
Col 3 : 10. Cf. Tillich's soteriological image, "the New Being."
@
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First is the gift of creation, which as far as man is concerned
comprises the gift of existence and the gift of humanness.
Individual man, in common with all other existent entities,
receives his being as a gift from God; the only answer to the
ancient question, "Why is there something and not nothing ?
is (in one sense) simple: "Because God wants something and
not nothing to be." lo Man also receives as a gift his humanness-the peculiar being of human being, characterized by a
conscious relationship and response to the divine, which is to
say, by a moral/religious freedom. l1
Second is the gift of continued existence in spite of sin. Sin
amounts to a self-determination toward non-being; for it is,
negatively, a turning away from God, the only ground of being,
and positively, a turning toward the human self, which has no
independent being. Having exercised his fundamental freedom
to choose non-being, man may appropriately expect the
actualization of his decision. The only explanation for the
continued existence of sinful man is the divine postponement
of the inevitable consequence of sin, in order to make forgiveness possible as a human experience, and because forgiveness
is already a fact in the being of God. l2
Third is the gift of revelation-the presentation of an
alternative to the experience of sin, guilt, and non-being.
For individual man must know both that there is an alternative and what it is before he can apprehend it and make it his
"

Jn I : 3 ; Col I : 16-17.
Barth, op. cit., 11111, 231 : "What God created when He created
the world and man was not just any place, but that which was foreordained for the establishment and the history of the covenant, nor just
any subject, but that which was to become God's partner in this history,
i.e., the nature which God in His grace willed to address and accept and
the man predestined for his service. The fact that the covenant is the
goal of creation is not something which is added later to the reality of
the creature, as though the history of creation might equally have been
succeeded by any other history. I t already characterises creation itself
and as such, and therefore the being and existence of the creature."
l8 Kiing, 09.cib., p. 179: "If sinful man were in an absolutely graceless
state, then man would not be left like a piece of wood with no will,
but rather would be cut off from the earth."
l1
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own. Therefore the gift of revelation includes a revelation of
what God has done and what this means for human being. l8
God forgives: this is the meaning of human life-both because
the fact of continued human life testifies to divine forgiveness,
and also because the fact of forgiveness gives meaning t o
human life. And God has acted in a self-involvement with man
in his predicament in such a way that God's involvement is
man's deliverance; this is the meaning of the Incarnation
and the Cross. Moreover, the gift of revelation also includes
a revelation of the possibilities open to man because of what
God has done-possibilities which are both immediate (e.g.,
freedom) and ultimate (transtemporal being with God).
Fourth is the gift of continued humanness, l4 which is to
say, intentionality. In spite of sin, God maintains man in the
way of being that is peculiarly human; God forgives me.n, not
meteorites, evergreen trees, or anthropoid apes. Now human
intentionality involves comprehension and volition ; thus the
gift of continued humanness includes, on the one hand,
comprehension of the gift of revelation, and comprehension
in turn includes the intellectual capacity for cognition and for
the existential apprehension of relevance (i.e., that in Christ
God forgives me). The gift of continued humanness also includes, on the other hand, volition, which is a matter of willing,
wanting, weighing, preferring, choosing.
Volition presupposes awareness and motivation adequate
to constitute an actually live option. 15 I t is in this sense
that faith is too a "gift." The "gift of faith" is not a divine
and irresistible bending of the will, which would amount to
Jn

I : 14; Heb I : 1-3; Rom3 : 21.
Kung, op. c i t ,p. 160 : "The sinner remains man even in and despite
his sin. Why ? Because God does not will the destruction of the sinner,
but spares him for his change of heart. And why can God spare him ?
Because He has chosen from eternity to take upon Himself the death of
the sinner. Redemption is the reason for the sinner's continuing to
exist. . . . Thus the sinner, remaining and remaining man, already
participates in the grace of his redemption."
l6 This may be part of the meaning of Jn 8 : 36.
14
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God's making the choice for (i.e., really instead of) man. It is,
rather, a "drawing" of man to the point where the response of
faith becomes a practical possibility. l6 This drawing is
ordinarily effected through the medium of some form of human
communication of the Gospel (i.e., of the divine revelation of
what God has done and what this means for human being),
but it may also perhaps be effected through the immediate
operation (whatever this may mean) of the Holy Spirit. l7
In any case, this "drawing" of individual man overcomes the
bias toward autonomous self-af f irmation (i.e., sin) prompted
internally by the insecurity arising from individual man's
awareness of his finitude, his guilt, and the threat of meaninglessness, Is and externally by an environment that at worst is
hostile to the Gospel and faith, and that a t best distorts both.
Thus the various "gifts"-the "elements" of divine activity
which merge into and complement one another-form the
pre-condition for the human experience of divine forgiveness.

The experienced event of divine forgiveness resides in a
certain volitional function, namely, a decision of faith. This
too is analogous to the experienced event of human forgiveness, which also is known only through the self-disclosure of
the one who forgives, and which can be received only by
volition.
The decision of faith has passive and active sides. The
passive side is an acknowledgment of reality-a decision to
accept the facts of individual man's existential need and God's
Thomas Aquinas' idea that God "moves" the mind in free choice
(cf. Summa Theologiae, 1-11, q. I I I , a. 2 ; q. I r 2, a. 2) can perhaps be
understood in terms of motivation rather than efficient cause.
What I am saying here is compatible with either an af firmative or
a negative answer to the vexed question of the possibility and/or
actuality of a genuine response of faith apart from an encounter with
the Christian gospel.
la Cf. Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven, 1952)~
pp. 40-57.
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gracious activity. In regard to ontological reality, the decision
of faith involves an acknowledgment of dependence on something beyond oneself. For existence, man is entirely dependent
on God's activity as Creator; for meaning, which is essential
to existence insofar as it is human existence, man is entirely
dependent on God's function as Lord. In regard to moral
reality, the decision of faith involves individual man's
acknowledgment of the wrongness and culpability of his own
existence-an acknowledgment, in other words, that there is
a standard of value outside himself, and that he has not lived
appropriately in relation to it, at best ignoring it and pretending that it did not exist, and at worst consciously rebelling
against it. 20
The active side of the decision of faith is individual man's
response to the reality of his need and God's activity. This is
first of all a response of trust-that is, a reliance on the integrity of God. I t is a reliance on (which means a certainty of,
confidence in, and dependence upon) the divine forgiveness
both as eternal in the being of God and as historical in the
Cross of Christ. It is also a corresponding non-reliance on
oneself as deserving forgiveness, either because of the worth
of past existence or because of the value of present or future
response. But the active side of the decision of faith is more
than a response of trust; it is also a response of self-commjtment-that is, a reliance on the practical relevance of God in
the life of individual man. (As the response of trust, which is
one aspect of the active side of the decision of faith, corresponds to the acknowledgment of guilt as one aspect of the
passive side, so also self-commitment, which is the other aspect
of the active side, corresponds to the acknowledgment of
ontological dependence as the other aspect of the passive side.)
Self-commitment is a willingness to obey, and thus presupl a Ibid., p. 51: "The threat to [man's] spiritual being is a threat
to his whole being."
2o A particularly strong emphasis on the acknowledgment of guilt
marks Luther's early Lectures on Romans.
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poses the mord/ethical relevance of the self-revelation of God
in Jesus Christ. The covenant relationship, expressed in the
reiterated formula "I am your God and you are my people," 21
involves a divine sovereignty over and claim to the lives of
those people who would, on their part, experience the covenant
relationship. 22 On the other hand, however, the response of
self-commitment is not an anticipation of perfect obedience,
Gen 17 : 8 ; E x 6 : 7; 19 : 5;Lev26 : 12;Dt26 : 17-19; Jer7 : 23;
: 4 ; 31 : 33; Eze 11 : 20; 1 4 : 1 1 ; Rev21 : 3. Cf. theideaof "peculiar people" (KJV) in Tit 2 : 14 ; I Pe 2 : g.
21

Ir

22 This aspect of faith as self-commitment has received insufficient
attention in theological formulations. Certainly the Reformation's
neglect of it is understandable (albeit unfortunate) in view of the acute
fear of every form of legalism. The modern period on the other hand
has in general been skeptical of anything that has seemed remotely
"heteronomous." To be sure, R. Bultmann has made a great deal of the
idea of "radical obedience" ; cf. Jesus and the Word (New York, 1958),
pp. 72-86, and Theology of the New Testament (New York, I ~ S I ) ,
I, 314-24. But this existentialist ethic is quite different from what I
have in mind here as "obedience." Somewhat closer is the early Bonhoffer, The Cost of Discipleship (New York, 1963), pp. 45-94, exposing
the comfortable and complacent "cheap grace" that is not at the same
time a call to self-giving obedience. But even here the effective
emphasis is on the horizontal, ethical claim upon a Christian obedientIy
to serve, without a corresponding emphasis on the vertical, purely
religious claim upon him obediently to worship. I n other, rather
Calvinistic terms: there is a tendency for the first table of the Law to
be obscured, or even swallowed up, by the second. The same tendency
appears in Brunner, Dogmatics (London, 1949-62), 111, 290-313 :
although he notes that "in the bestowal of the gift of faith there is
always directly implicit the summons to obedience" (p. 297), he
dissociates this obedience from any "general rules of obligation,"
which he sees as a "reintroduction of the law by the back door of the
so-called third use of the law" (p. 300). Finally, Kiing's omission of the
idea of self-commitment from his explanation of justification may be
significant here, although i t is perhaps to be explained by his specific
methodology, namely, a development of parallels between Barth and
authentic Tridentine theology.
In short, whether understood religiously or ethically, prescriptively
or contextually, obedience has been regularly viewed as a concomitant
or consequence of faith, whereas I am here suggesting that a "commitment to obey" or a t least a "willingness to obey" is constitutive of
faith itself. Barth, indeed, suggests this idea; cf. op. cit., IVIr, 620:
"Faith is the humility of obedience." But he does not develop it.
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for it is aware that life remains ambiguous, that individual
man's pride is not annihilated, and that his ability to control
his own reactions is limited. 23 Furthermore, even to the extent
that it is actualized, obedience is never intended to become a
claim on God's forgiveness. It is always a consequence of the
&vine activity; the very willingness to obey is, like the
response of trust, grounded in God's prior attitude and act of
forgiveness. Finally, obedience is not intended to be a "proof"
of righteousness; 24 it may be an evidence of the response of
faith, but the whole point of faith is its total disavowal of
one's own righteousness.
So the decision of faith, always an act of human volition
grounded in God's prior activity, is both an acknowledgment
of individual man's ontological dependence and moral guilt,
and a response of trust and self-commitment.

What happens to individual man in the experienced event
of divine forgiveness ? Certainly such an existentially crucial
event makes a difference, but how is that difference best
understood and described ? Just as certainly, a forgiven sinner
is still a sinmer; yet it seems clear that when he is fargiven

something is basically changed in the way in which he is as a
23 Barth, o p . cit., IV/x, 596 : "There is no moment in his life in which
[the justified man] does not have to look for and await and with
outstretched hands request both forgiveness and therefore freedom
from his sins." The whole sub-section, "The Pardon of Man," pp. 568698 is an exposition of the tension of sirnu1justus et fieccator. Brunner,
op. cit., 111, 293 : a man "filled by God's Holy Spirit" is "precisely the
person who perceives with an exceptional clarity the infinite distance
that still separates him from his goal." Cf. also R. Niebuhr, The Nature
and Destiny of Man (New York, 1941-43)) 11, 127-56.
24 Luther, Lectures on Romans, tr. W. Pauck (Philadelphia, 1961),
p. 123: " 'Without works' must be understood . . . to refer to works by
the performance of which one thinks he has obtained righteousness, as
if one were righteous by virtue of such works or as if God regarded and
accepted him as righteous because he did them. . . . It is not so much
works, as such, as the interpretation and foolish estimation one applies
to them that are disapproved,"
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sinner. This change may be understood under three aspects.
Forgiven man has a changed status: still a sinner, he is
nevertheless now forgiven as sinner. This is the "forensic"
aspect of the change wrought in the experience of forgiveness.
I t does not, however, ignore the real facts of sinful man's
existence. I t does not pretend that sin has not happened and
will not continue to happen. I t does not amount to a declaring
righteous (by God) of someone whom everybody (God, the
man himself, and the world) knows is not righteous. Hence
forgiveness cannot be simply "acquittal" in the sense of
declaring "not guilty," (i.e., declaring that the man had not
sinned). This would be a denial of reality, a deception
unthinkable on the part of God. Forgiveness is therefore a
deliberate "in spite of" or "notwithstanding"-a "taking into
accountJ' of sin, but not letting it be determinative of the
relationship between God and man. Forgiveness has no
meaning apart from a mutual recognition of the fact of sin,
past and present.
Yet it must be emphasized that forgiveness in its forensic
aspect is not "merely verbal." In many areas of life, words do
more than "say" ; they commit, they purchase, they betray.
In short, they "perform." 27 As an event, a wedding is essentially a verbal event; yet the minister's formula, "I pronounce
you husband and wife" is not simply a description. These
words (together with the expressed vows) in a profound sense
With this different mode of being evidently in mind, Kiing, o?. cit.,
pp. 69, 85, 260-61, and 268, characterizes the change as "ontological."
36 Because "acquit" may mean "discharge from a debt or obligation," the RSV reading of Rom 5 : 18 is technically correct: "As one
man's trespass led to condemnation for all men, so one man's act of
righteousness leads to acquittal and life for all men." But because the
more common understanding of "acquit" is "declare not guilty," this
reading tends to be misleading.
3 7 On the "performative" function of language, cf. J. L. Austin,
HOW to Do Things with Words (New York, 1965); also D. Evans,
The Logic of SeZf-Involvement (Landon, 1963)~pp. 27-78. Another
example of the theological use of this idea is James W. McClendon,
"Baptism as a Performative Sign," ThT, XXIII (1966-67), 403-16.
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change the being of a man and a woman, who now are in a new
way, i.e., as husband and as wife. Likewise the words "I
forgive" are not a description of what one is now doing
(cf. "1 am listening to the radio"); they are the means of
changing the way in which the one who forgives and the one
forgiven are toward each other. Thus the experienced event
of divine forgiveness is a creative event, the inauguration
of a new way of being. 28 And this brings us to the second
aspect of the "change by forgiveness."
Forgiven man is reoriented man; this is the "religious"
aspect of the change. There is now a new center of meaningwhat God has done and is doing in creation and forgiveness.
No longer does human existence derive its meaning from individual man's own self and its accomp~shments-or from
those apparently-noble but actually-limited extensions of the
self: the family, the church, the nation. No longer is life
characterized by sequential polytheism. 29 For there is (to
change the metaphor) a new direction-new goals, aims, and
values by which life is guided. This does not necessarily mean
a vocational change; what is involved is not so much the
content of individual existence and responsibility-in-life as its
intention and context, 30 not SO much what is done professionally, but how and why. (Of course, the reorientation
effected by forgiveness may involve a change in vocation ; it
28 Barth, op. &it.,IV/I, 570 : "This pardon does not mean only that
something is said concerning us, or, as it were, pasted on us, but that
a fact is created, a human situation which is basically altered."
Brunner, 09. cit., 111, 197: as justified, the sinner "receives a new
personal being, a new person as his own."
H. R. Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (New York, 1960),
p. 77 : "As a rule men are polytheists, referring now to this and now to
that valued being as the source of life's meaning. Sometimes they live
for Jesus' God, sometimes for country and sometimes for Yale. For the
most part they make gods out of themselves or out of the work of their
own hands, living for their own glory as persons and as communities."
Luther's doctrine of the "two realms" says something important
about the being of forgiven man even if the dichotomy cannot finally
be maintained in the terms Luther uses.

"
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is probably impossible for forgiven man to function with
integrity in some vocations.)
Finally, forgiven man is a newly free man; this is the
"psychological" aspect of forgiveness. Here the dialectic of
existence-as-forgiven is particularly apparent. Man is free in
respect to God; yet this does not mean that he has forgotten
his sin and guilt. On the contrary, he is more aware of it than
ever; yet he is not crushed or dominated by it. He can now
act even coram Deo with a certain boldness; for although he is
aware that he is still a creature and a sinner, he is also aware
that he is a creature and sinner whose nature and sin God has
taken into himself and overcome. 31 Forgiven man is also
newly free in regard to his fellow men. While he is more aware
than ever of human interrelationships and of the impossibility
of independent existence, he is not threatened by the possibility of hostility, disregard, or contempt (at least he need
not be so threatened), for the center of meaning cannot be
affected crucially by any man outside himself. On the positive
side, forgiven man can accept his unacceptable fellow man
without pretending that he is really acceptable, because he is
profoundly aware that he himself has been so accepted by God.
He can now relate to fellow men without using them. And
forgiven man is newly free in respect to himself. More aware
than ever of his own ambiguities, he has no longer a need
defensively to deny their reality; for his inner security as
individual man does not depend on his achievements professionally, socially, or personally. He can now even begin to be
truly righteous without having to use his righteousness as
ego-support . 32
31 As Barth emphasizes, the divine Y e s underlies, interpenetrates,
and finally overcomes the divine No.
38 Brunner, 09. cit., 111, 200: "Self-justification is no longer possible
for the man for whom Christ was nailed on the Cross. I t is not necessary
for the man to whom God says 'You are my son.' " It is to the potentialities of this freedom that Jesus pointed in the sayings of M t 5-7;
cf. J, Jeremias, The Sermon on the Mount, N . Perrin, tr. (London, rg6r),
pp. 32-33 : "These sayings of Jesus delineate the lived faith. They say :
You are forgiven; you are the child of God; you belong to His kingdom.
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Thus what happens in the experience of forgiveness is a
fundamental change in the way of being of individual man.

The content of this paper may be summarized very briefly :
(I) Forgiveness is eternal in the being of God, historically
enacted in the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth and experienced in the existence of individual man. (2) Forgiveness
is predicated on the prior divine gifts of creation, continued
existence and humanness in spite of sin, and revelation.
(3) Forgiveness is experienced in a decision of faith which
comprises an acknowledgment of dependence and guilt and a
response of trust and commitment. (4) Forgiveness effects a
fundamental change in the way of human being, seen as change
of status, reorientation of existence, and new freedom toward
God, fellow man, and oneself. And all of this is involved in
the meaning of "justification."

.

. . You no longer belong to yourself; rather you belong to the city
of God, the light of which shines in the darkness. Now you may also
experience it: out of the thankfulness of a redeemed child of God a new
life is growing."

